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5 « To simplify the study of the mind, many scientists initially ignored the social aspects of
human behavior with the notion that social processes could be considered later if the
need  arose;  would  be  more  explicable  once  the  basics  of  the  brain  and  mind  were
determined; or had minimal implications for basic development, structure, or processes
of the human brain or mind » (Cacioppo, Berntson, Lorig, Norris, Rickett, and Nusbaum,
2003, p. 659). According to Cacioppo et al. (2003), however, evidence that humans are
fundamentally social animals who can exist only in a web of relationships (Cacioppo,
Bernston, Sheridan, & McClintock 2000) and that even basic information processes can be
modulated by the presence or actions of conspecifics (Cacioppo, 2002 ; Cacioppo et al.
(2002) belies these early arguments.  In line with this,  Huguet,  Galvaing,  Monteil,  and
Dumas (1999) demonstrated that forced-comparison of one’s performance with that of a
superior  coactor  (physically  present)  prevents,  at  least  temporarily,  the  spread  of
activation to the lexical-semantic level (what has been thought to be invariant automatic
processing in Stroops’ paradigm), as shown by a significant reduction of the well-known
Stroop effect (see also Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004). The current paper expands on
this prior research. We report two new studies where the comparison others were simply
mentally represented rather than physically present. The results offer evidence (first to
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date) that information about one’s relative standing on the Stroop task is sufficient for a
reduction of the Stroop effect to occur. 
Stroop Effect and Social Context
6 The Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) is one of the best-known effects in cognitive psychology.
Research participants typically take much longer to name the ink color of a color word
depicting a color incongruent with the ink color (e.g., the word RED printed in green)
than to name the color of a patch of color, of a string of Xs or symbols, or of noncolor
words. In his extensive review, MacLeod (1991) counted more than 700 articles dealing
with this effect, either examining it directly or using it as a tool to study other cognitive
processes,  making  the  Stroop  effect  one  of  the  most  well-replicated  phenomena  in
experimental psychology. A core assumption of virtually all the theoretical accounts of
this effect is that skilled readers process the incongruent word without conscious intent.
The reading of the word is said to be automatic in the sense that readers cannot refrain
from accessing the meaning of the word despite explicit instructions not to do so. 
7 There is a large body of evidence, however, suggesting that few processes, if any, are
entirely independent of attentional control (e.g., Logan, 1980). Besner, Stolz, and Boutilier
(1997), for example, used a modification of the Stroop task in which only a single letter of
the  incongruent  words  was  coloured.  Stroop  interference  was  either  reduced  or
eliminated  in  this  condition,  suggesting  that  spatial  attention  was  focused,  thus
preventing lexical-semantic activation (at least temporarily). 
8 Preliminary evidence that the lexical-semantic level can be disabled and/or overridden
by socio-contextual factors or factors not restricted to the local context of the task can be
found in MacKinnon, Geiselman, and Woodward (1985). These authors used the standard
vocal version of the Stroop task and tested the influence of interpersonal competition on
the Stroop effect. Participants were tested either individually or in pairs. In the latter
condition (competition), they were told that the fastest one on the task would receive one
extra credit. While one participated in the Stroop session, the other waited outside until
it was his/her turn. Competing for a reward increased self-reports of task-specific effort
and the Stroop effect was 25% smaller in this condition, compared with the individual or
no-competition condition. MacKinnon et al. concluded that subjects can reduce Stroop
interference when their effort is focused in that direction. 
9 Several arguments, however, make this motivational explanation not very plausible. First
of all, it is well-known that a skilled reader’s intent to not read the colour words is not
enough to prevent lexical-semantic activation in the Stroop task (e.g., Reisberg, 1997).
Second, recent results (Huguet et al., 1999, 2004) suggest that the presence of a desired
reward (and related positive effect on self-reports of effort) did not play a key role in
MacKinnon et al.’s findings. In Huguet et al.’s (1999) Study 2, participants performed a
manual version of the Stroop task in the (supposedly incidental) presence versus absence
of a confederate-coactor (i.e., a same-sex peer working simultaneously but independently
on an identical task).  Coaction facilitated Stroop performance, at least in participants
faced with a coactor performing better than themselves on the Stroop task, suggesting
that the presence of a self-threatening comparison other is a sufficient condition for
MacKinnon et al.’s findings to occur. In MacKinnon et al.’s studies, all participants worked
alone on the Stroop task. In the condition where a competitor was waiting outside the
experimental room, however, they could ruminate about forthcoming interactions with
the competitor during which a comparison of performance would take place. This could
divert attention, at least temporarily, from the semantic level (i.e., could preclude the
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spread of activation to this level), resulting in a smaller Stroop effect. Huguet et al. (2004)
tested the effects of competition more directly in a study where the physical presence (no
longer  incidental)  versus  absence  of  a  competitor  and  of  a  desired  reward  were
manipulated orthogonally during the Stroop session (both factors were confounded in
MacKinnon  et  al.’s  studies).  As  expected,  whereas  competition  facilitated  Stroop
performance, it had no effect on the self-reports of effort. The prospect of a desirable
reward increased the self-reports of effort but had no impact on the size of the Stroop
effect. In a series of three studies, Chajut and Algom (2003) also concluded that the Stroop
effect remains unchanged under heightened motivation but decreases under heightened
stress (induced via non-social stressors such as intense noise). As they put it, improved
selectivity of attention in the Stroop task «is not subject to strategic influences and is
probably activated in an unconscious and default fashion on the appearance of stress» (p.
245).  There is indeed ample evidence today that heightened level of arousal or stress
impairs the attentional apparatus, with fewer resources available for more peripheral or
less relevant information (Wells & Matthews, 1994). 
10 Finally,  almost  twenty-years  ago,  Baron  (1986)  reported  several  evidence  that  the
presence of competitors is a sufficient condition for a relative narrowing of attention to
occur.  In settings where there is  pressure to perform a task quickly and well,  Baron
reasoned, the self-threatening presence of others leads to attentional conflict, that is, a
form of response conflict regarding what attentional response one should make, at least
when attending  to  others  is  incompatible  with  task  demands.  This  conflict  typically
increases stress and/or threatens the organism with cognitive overload (or both), two
phenomena which, in turn, can lead (in combination or separately) to a restriction in
attention focus (Cohen, 1978; Muller, Atzeni, & Butera, 2004).
11 Whatever  their  explanation,  the  findings  reported  earlier  (Huguet  et  al.,  1999,  2004,
MacKinnon et al., 1985), when examined together, suggest that a relative narrowing of
attention and thus an alteration of  the Stroop effect  should still  be found in a  very
minimal  social  condition.  That  is,  1)  when the comparison others  are  not  physically
present but only mentally represented (as in MacKinnon et al., 1985), and simultaneously
2) when competitive pressures are not made salient, provided that the comparison others
outperform the self (as in Huguet et al., 1999).
The present studies
12 The present studies tested this hypothesis in two different ways. In Study 1, participants
were  forced  to  compare  their  performance  on  practice  Stroop  trials  with  that  of  a
physically present confederate-coactor (Time 1), and then worked alone on the Stroop
task (Time 2). Participants who are slightly inferior to the coactor (upward comparison at
Time 1), we predicted, should display a smaller stroop effect (Time 2) than those working
alone at  both Time 1 and Time 2,  or those working in presence of  a similar (lateral
comparison)  or  inferior  (downward  comparison)  coactor  at  Time  1.  In  Study  2,
participants worked alone at both Time 1 and Time 2 in each condition. They simply
received a feedback at Time 1, which forced them to compare their performance on the
practice trials  with that  of  their  reference (peer)  group.  A smaller Stroop effect  was
expected in participants who were faced with upward comparison than in those who did
not receive comparison information, or those who received information indicating that
they were either similar (lateral comparison) or slightly superior (downward comparison)
to the group standard.
Study 1MethodParticipants
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13 The participants were 42 introductory psychology students (from 18 to 23 years old) at
Blaise Pascal University (Clermont-Ferrand),  who volunteered to participate in partial
fulfilment  of  a  course  requirement.  Only  females  were  retained  because  of  the  low
number of males available at the time of the experiment. All participants were right-
handed, reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and were naive on the
purpose of  the experiments presented as part  of  a  larger research project  on colour
perception.
Procedure and Materials
14 Preliminary phase. The participants arrived individually at the laboratory and were met by
a female experimenter who described the Stroop task. Then they performed five practice
sessions of 20 trials each including only colour-neutral words (e.g., CHAIR). They were
asked to ignore the words and respond to the ink colours as quickly and as accurately as
possible. On each trial, a word was presented at a fixation point in the center of a light
grey computer screen (viewing distance = 60 cm), in one of four colours (blue, green, red,
or yellow).  Each word was removed from the computer screen after 200 ms (with an
interstimulus interval of 1 sec). Stimulus duration was long enough for the words to be
read and/or the colour to be recognized. It was also short enough for each word to be off
the screen before the computer key was pressed. The keys K (for BLUE ), F (for GREEN), S
(for RED), and M (for YELLOW) were used as correct responses. They were covered by
blue, green, red, and yellow adhesive labels, respectively. Participants positioned their
index and middle fingers of their left and right hands on top of each of the keys. Half of
them received the red and green labels on the left hand and the blue and yellow labels on
the right  hand,  whereas  for  the  other  half  the  order  was  reversed.  During the  fifth
training session,  the four coloured labels were replaced with white labels so subjects
knew that looking at the response keys was now useless. 
15 Social Comparison manipulation. The participants performed the last training session either
alone  or  in  the  incidental  presence  of  a  female  (peer)  confederate  coactor,  due  to
«technical problems in the adjacent room». The confederate immediately and publicly
said  to  the  experimenter  that  she  had  performed  four  training  sessions  before  her
computer crashed, so that participants were informed that she had exactly the same
amount  of  practice  as  themselves  on  the  task.  Social  comparison  indeed  does  not
necessarily occur (or does not necessarily affect performance) when the coactors differ
on attributes related to the task at hand (Goethals & Darley, 1977). Then, the confederate
sat at another computer opposite the participants, within their peripheral vision. The
experimenter gave the speed-accuracy instructions again, then the starting signal, and
left the room. Throughout this last training session, participants were forced to compare
their response speed with that of the confederate who made particularly loud keypresses
that could not be easily ignored. The confederate responded either slightly more slowly,
similarly, or slightly faster than the participants. This difference in performance speed
was  made  possible  by  varying  the  confederate’s  interstimulus  interval  (which  was
identical  to vs.  longer or shorter of  500 ms than that  of  participants).  Once the last
training session ended, the participants were informed that they did not differ from the
person  present  regarding  response  accuracy  (same  number  of  errors),  and  thus
participants who were faced with a slower or faster coactor could readily attribute the
difference in performance speed to a difference in ability.
16 The experimenter then publicly informed the confederate that the technical problem on
her computer was now completely solved. She was invited to perform the Stroop task
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alone in the adjacent room. Participant, therefore, performed the Stroop task alone in
each condition. The experimenter left the room in each condition on all sessions (training
and Stroop). 
17 After the Stroop task, participants in the coaction conditions were asked to rate how
quickly they performed at training in relation to the coactor on a 7-point scale ranging
from  -  3  (much  slower)  to +  3  (much  faster),  including  zero (same  speed).  This
manipulation  check  was  also  used  as  a  measure  of  distraction  related  to  social
comparison  (to  be  accurate  some  attention  has  to  be  allocated  to  the  other  person
present). In order to see whether participants perceived that they did not differ from the
coactor on response accuracy on the practice trials, they were also asked to rate how they
were accurate on the task in relation to the coactor. This was made on a 7-point scale 
ranging from "much less errors" (1) to "much more errors" (7),  including zero (same
number of errors). Finally, participants were debriefed. 
18   Stroop task. The Stroop words were taken from MacKinnon et al. (1985). They included 4
colour words (BLUE, GREEN, RED, and YELLOW) that were part of the response set,  4
colour words that were not part of the response set (e.g., BLACK, GREY, ORANGE, and
WHITE), and 12 colour-related words (e.g., SKY, CANARY). Each word was generated in
one of the four target colours, excluding congruent colours. Control stimuli appeared as a
row of three, four, five, or six coloured Xs. Each stimulus was generated twice by the
computer, resulting in 80 test trials (40 incongruent words and 40 control signs). As in the
training sessions, each stimulus was removed from the computer screen after 200 ms.
Stroop interference was measured by subtracting RTs for control signs (row of Xs) from
RTs for incongruent words, which is the usual way of measuring it (see Kuhl & Kazén,
1999; MacLeod, 1991). The use of congruent trials (e.g., the word RED printed in red) has
also been recommended as the neutral baseline (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). A drawback of
this procedure, however, is that the inclusion of congruent trials provides an incentive
for subjects to process irrelevant words (e.g., Besner, 2001). MacKinnon et al. (1985) used
control  signs  (series  of +  signs),  and this  also  influenced  our  decision  to  retain  this
baseline. Making use of a vocal Stroop task, as MacKinnon et al. did, was not appropriate
in  the  present  study  where  the  participants  and  confederate’s  oral  responses  could
interfere with each other at each trial during the last training session. However, there is
evidence that the semantic level is also activated when subjects use the manual word
response (Besner, 2001; McKenna & Sharma, 1995). 
Results 
19 Manipulation checks. A One-Way ANOVA on perceived relative response speed at training
showed a main effect of Social Comparison, F(2, 29) = 43.53, p < .0001 ( F0682 = .75). Not only
were  the  three  corresponding  means  in  the  expected  direction  (Downward = 1.14;
Lateral = 0.18; Upward = -1.18), but each differed significantly from the other two (Tuckey
HSD, ps < .05). Also as expected, one sample t-tests indicated that each mean (Upward and
Downward) but one (Lateral) differed significantly (ps < .0001) from the midpoint of the
scale (0). No effects were found on perceived relative performance accuracy. Thus, the
manipulations were clearly successful.
20 RT data. Trials with RTs faster than 300 ms (1 % of the trials) or slower than 2500 ms (2 %
of  the trials)  were excluded.  The remaining RTs were then analyzed via  a  2  (Stroop
stimuli: Incongruent words vs. Control signs) x 4 (Social Comparison: None, Downward,
Lateral, Upward) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Stroop stimuli as the within-
subjects  variable.  This  simple  analysis  (where  RT from incorrect  responses  were  not
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eliminated) was retained because it came close to that used by MacKinnon et al. (1985),
and thus offered a more direct comparison with their data. In MacKinnon et al.’s studies,
the Stroop stimuli were not isolated but presented all together on cards (different cards
were used for the incongruent words and for the control signs). As a consequence, the
processing times related to incorrect responses could not be removed. That being said, all
the RT findings reported later in the present paper did also hold when only RT data from
correct responses were retained, and then subjected to a recursive trimming procedure
where the criterion cutoff for outlier removal was established independently for each
subject, in each condition, by reference to the sample size in that condition (Van Selst &
Jolicoeur, 1994). In the first series of RT findings presented below, the incongruent colour
words included each type of stimulus item (response-set colour words, non-response-set
colour words, and colour-related words, see Table 1), as in MacKinnon et al. (1985). 
 
Table 1. Stroop performance as a function of Social Comparison (standard errors in parentheses)
Note. a : p = .10 (two-tailed).
21 The main effect for Stroop stimuli was significant, F(1, 38) = 42.21, p < .0001 ( F0682
 =
 .53).
Faster RTs were found for the control signs (M = 717, SD = 101) than for the incongruent
words (M = 757, SD = 113), indicating the emergence of a Stroop effect (40 ms). The main
effect for Social  Comparison was also significant,  F(3,  38) = 3.15,  p <  .04 ( F0682
 =
 .20).  As
showed by post-hoc contrasts (Tukey HSD), participants responded faster in the Upward
than in the Downward Comparison condition (p < .05).  The expected Stroop stimuli  x
Social Comparison interaction was significant as well, F(3, 38) = 2.99, p < .05 ( F0682
 =
 .19). In
order to better understand this  interaction,  it  was broken down in three orthogonal
contrasts with the Stroop difference score (Incongruent words – Control signs) as the
dependent  variable  (see  Figure  1).  The  first  one  contrasted  the  Upward  Comparison
condition (10 ms) with the average of the three other conditions (50 ms). The second
contrasted the No-Comparison condition (49 ms) with the average of the Downward and
Lateral Comparison conditions (51 ms). Finally, the third contrasted the Downward (57
ms) and Lateral (45 ms) comparison conditions. As expected, only the first contrast was
significant,  t(38) =  -2.93,  p <  .007.  The Stroop effect  was in fact  not  significant in the
Upward Comparison condition, t(10) = 1.22, p = .25. Using identical statistical power, it was
clearly significant in each of the three other conditions (ps < .0001). 
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Figure 1. Stroop effect by social comparison
22 The Stroop effect is more commonly defined as the difference in RTs between response-
set  colour  words  and  the  baseline.  Due  to  the  group  version  of  their  Stroop  task,
MacKinnon et al.  could not isolate this more conventional difference. Did the present
findings hold when this difference was used as the dependent variable? It did: Among the
three orthogonal contrasts used earlier for the global interference, the first one was still
significant on the classic Stroop difference score (56 ms for the Upward condition vs. 125
ms for the three other conditions averaged, p <.05). 
23 Error  Rate.  Participants’  error  rate  were  analyzed  using  the  same  mixed  analysis  of
variance  as  before.  This  analysis  did  not  yield  any  significant  effects.  Clearly,  the
facilitating effect  of  upward comparison on response speed did not  covary with any
significant change in performance accuracy. As is typically the case with the Stroop task,
participants’ error rate was extremely low (2 % on the Incongruent words and 2 % on the
Control  signs,  overall).  Significant  negative correlations between RTs and error rates
might indicate a speed-accuracy trade-off if they are found only in the condition where
the facilitation effects were found (Kulh & Kazén, 1999). This was clearly not the case.
Over the 8 correlations (see Table 1), 6 were negative and none of them were significant. 
Discussion 
24 It was predicted that upward comparison with a physically present coactor on practice
Stroop trials (Time 1) would afterwards facilitate performance when working alone on
the Stroop task (Time 2).  This is exactly what we found. The Stroop effect was much
smaller in the upward comparison condition than in the three other conditions (no-
comparison, downward and lateral comparisons). Evidence that the participants in the
coaction conditions really engaged in social comparison can be found in the mean of
perceived speed difference ratings. All of these ratings were in the expected direction,
indicating that some attention was allocated to the confederate (i.e., external distraction)
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at Time 1. Because each participant worked alone at Time 2 (Stroop task), the fact that
upward comparison removed the Stroop effect cannot be due to external distractions.
Internal distractions related to what happened to the self on the practice trials are more
plausible here. 
25 Their very nature remains unspecified,  however.  Upward comparison on the practice
trials could trigger ruminations related to one’s inferiority during the Stroop session, at
the time during which the Stroop words were processed. But it could also activate some
thoughts about the diagnosticity of the comparison episode itself. After all, the meaning
of such an episode depends on whether the more successful comparison other reflects the
norm or is simply an especially efficient person, that is, someone exceptional and not
reflecting the norm (see  Alicke,  LoSchiavo,  Zerbst,  & Zhang,  1997;  Tesser,  1988 ).  In
addition, during the Stroop session, participants could anticipate an interaction (at the
end of  the  experiment)  with  the  person present  at  training  (Time 1).  The  coactor’s
typicality  and  the  anticipated  interaction  with  this  person,  both  could  also  divert
attention, at least temporarily,  from the semantic level,  resulting in a smaller Stroop
effect. Thus, one question that arises is whether this smaller Stroop effect can still be
associated  with  upward  comparison  when  distracting  cognitions  related  to  the
diagnosticity of the comparison and/or forthcoming interactions with the comparison
other are eliminated from the experimental setting. 
26 Of particular interest here, the typicality of the coactor is a very common and seldom
addressed question in social comparison studies. All the more reason for us to address
this question in Study 2, in which participants were forced to compare themselves with
their peer group rather than with a single person. Because the average performance of
one’s peer group reflects a valuable norm, comparisons with this standard are indeed
especially diagnostic of one’s level of ability (at least more diagnostic than comparisons
with a single person). Consistent with this, there is today ample evidence that people
typically choose to compare their personal attributes (abilities as well as opinions) within
their  peer group (Zanna,  Goethals,  & Hill,  1975 ;  see also Huguet,  Dumas,  Monteil,  &
Genestoux, 2001). If feelings about one’s inferiority per se (i.e., regardless of other sources
of distraction related to the diagnosticity of the comparison episode and/or anticipated
interaction) are sufficient for a reduction of the Stroop effect to occur, we reasoned, then
this  reduction should still  be found when participants  are simply forced to compare
upward with their peer group (while working alone at both Time 1--practice trials and
Time 2--Stroop session). 
Study 2MethodParticipants
27 Thirty-two introductory psychology students (26 females and 6 males from 18 to 22 years
old)  at  Blaise  Pascal  University  (Clermont-Ferrand)  participated  in  return  for  extra
course.  All  participants  were  right-handed,  reported  normal  or  corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, and were naive on the purpose of the experiment. 
Procedure and Materials
28 This second study differed from the previous one only on two points. First of all, before
the Stroop session, participants performed four (instead of five) series of practice Stroop
trials (because of the low number of errors found at session 4 in the previous study).
Second, and most important, at the end of the fourth training session, participants were
instructed that their average reaction time and error rate will be compared to those of
previous participants as themselves. Previous participants, it was said, were « male and
female undergraduates from psychology (major) who came from your own university ».
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This  comparison  was  presented  as  a  means  to  better  understand  the  meaning  of
participants’ data. They were informed that their error rate was both less than 3% (which
was true) and similar to that of most previous participants. Then it was said that the
previous  participants  responded  between  735  and  765  ms  in  average,  and  then  the
current participants were informed about their own (bogus) mean RT: In the downward,
lateral,  and  upward  comparison  conditions,  this  RT  was  599,  750,  and  901  ms,
respectively.  For  clarity,  the  experimenter  said  that,  compared  with  the  previous
participants,  they had performed «slightly faster» (downward condition),  «similarly »
(lateral condition), and «slightly slower » (upward condition). The participants were then
faced with the Stroop task alone in each condition. 
Results
29 Stroop Performance. RTs were analyzed as before. The data are reported in Table 2. The
main effect for Stroop stimuli was significant, F(1, 28) = 63.47, p < .0001 ( F0682= .69). Longer
RTs were found for the Incongruent words (M = 967, SD = 139) than for the Control signs (
M = 902, SD = 124), indicating the presence of a Stroop effect (65 ms). Although the mean
RT was relatively low in the Upward condition (as previously), the main effect for Social
Comparison was not really significant, F(3, 28) = 1.98, p = .14 ( F0682
 =
 .18). In contrast, the
Stroop stimuli x Social Comparison interaction was still clearly significant, F(3, 28) = 4.19,
p < .02 ( F0682= .31). 
 
Table 2. Stroop performance as a function of Social Comparison Feedback (standard errors in
parentheses) 
30 This interaction was broken down in the same three orthogonal contrasts as before, with
the Stroop difference score as the dependent variable (Figure 2). The first one contrasted
the Upward Comparison condition (17 ms) with the average of the three other conditions
(81 ms). The second contrasted the No-Comparison condition (94 ms) with the average of
the Downward and Lateral Comparison conditions (75 ms). Finally, the third contrasted
the Downward (77 ms) and Lateral (73 ms) comparison conditions. Once more, only the
first contrast was significant, t(1,28) = 3.40, p < .0031. In the Upward comparison condition,
the Stroop difference score was not  statistically  significant,  t(7) =  1.34,  p =  .22.  Using
identical statistical power, it was clearly significant in each of the three other conditions (
ps < .0001).  
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Figure 2. Stroop effect by social comparison
31 As  in  Study  1,  among  the  three  orthogonal  contrasts  used  earlier  for  the  global
interference, only the first one was significant on the classic Stroop effect (62 ms for the
Upward condition vs. 234 ms for the three other conditions averaged, p <.01). One may
wonder why the global as well as classic Stroop effect were here slightly higher than in
Study 1. Participants performed only four practice sessions (not five as before), and this
may help explain this difference between the two studies.  
32 Error Rate.  Once more,  this analysis did not yield any significant effects.  Participants’
error rate was extremely low (2 % on the Incongruent words and 1 % on the Control signs,
overall). Correlational analyses did not support a speed-accuracy trade-off interpretation
of the data (Table 2).
General Discussion
33 The present findings deserve attention in a number of important ways. First of all, they
clarify the conditions under which a social  comparison standard promotes a relative
narrowing of attention, and thus an alteration of the Stroop effect.  MacKinnon et al.
(1985) reported evidence that this effect is reduced when competing with others for a
desired reward. Huguet et al. (1999, 2004) demonstrated that this reduction did not result
from the perspective of being rewarded and was due to the self-threatening presence of
comparison others. The present findings go a step further. They show that the Stroop
effect is reduced whenever the subject is threatened by social comparison, even in the
lack of competitive instructions and comparison others during the Stroop session (i.e., at
the time during which the Stroop words are processed).  Clearly,  the threat of  being
inferior to significant others seems to be sufficient for an alteration of the Stroop effect to
occur.
34 Consistent with this, there is evidence that the state of failure can promote a relative
narrowing of attention (Wells & Matthews, 1994). This had not been shown in the Stroop
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task,  however.  Our findings do not  mean that  failure or at  least  the threat  of  being
inferior to others does necessarily cause attention to focus. When failure at a given task is
socially  shared,  or  can  be  attributed  to  external  factors  (e.g.,  the  context  of  task
performance), it is simply not meaningful and can be ignored. Here, participants who
compared upward could not easily ignore their inferiority. Once more, in the two studies,
they were led to believe that the comparison others were similar to them on several
attributes potentially related to the Stroop task (same age, same affiliation, same number
of practice trials).  They were also made comparable to the social  standard regarding
response accuracy. As a consequence, those faced with upward comparison (and with
downward comparison as  well)  could readily attribute the difference in performance
speed to a difference in ability. Ability inferences is probably a pre-condition for findings
such as those reported here to occur. Exactly why should upward comparison alter Stroop
interference  in  the  lack  of  these  inferences?  One may think that  seeing,  or  at  least
thinking about others doing better than themselves conducted participants to set higher
personal standards (Seta, 1982), or to identify themselves with the more successful others
(Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Collins,  1996; Huguet et al.,  2001; Rijsman,
1983),  which,  in turn,  motivated task-specific  efforts.  Again,  however,  there is  ample
evidence that the Stroop effect remains unchanged under heightened motivation but
decreases under heightened stress (Chajut & Algom, 2003;  Huguet et  al.,  2004).  Thus,
there are good reasons to believe that feelings about one’s inferiority did play a key role
in the present findings.
35 Second, as suggested earlier in this paper, that a self-related threat (here due to upward
comparison information or feedback) reduces otherwise eliminates the Stroop effect is
consistent with a number of theories relating stress/emotional arousal and attention.
According to Baron’s (1986) distraction-conflict theory, for example, evaluative threats,
at least when attending to them conflicts with task demands, are expected to increase
emotional arousal and/or cognitive overload (or both). Two phenomena which, in turn,
can  lead  (in  combination  or  separately)  to  a  restriction  in  attention  focus,  so
that individuals attend more to cues that are most central to the task (or alternatively
most central spatially in the display) at the expense of more peripheral cues,  as also
suggested by a large body of data in the attention literature (Broadbent, 1971 ; Cohen,
1978  ;  Eysenck,  1982 ;  Derryberry  & Reed,  2001;  Kahneman,  1973;  Newman,  Wallace,
Strauman, Skolaski, Oreland, Mattek, Elder, & McNeely, 1993 ; Wells & Matthews, 1994).
From Baron’s theory, therefore, participants who were faced with upward comparison
displayed a smaller Stroop effect due to a restriction in attention focus that led them to
screen out the incorrect semantic cues and focus more exclusively on the letter color
cues. 
36 Chajut  and  Algom  (2003)  also  concluded  that  heightened  stress/emotional  arousal
improves the selectivity of attention, so that word recognition processes operate less
efficiently, as indicated by a significant reduction of the Stroop effect. Using two classes
of selectivity measures (Stroop and Garner effects), they demonstrated that the impact of
Stress  is  not  perceptual,  as  the  salience  of  the  relevant  and  irrelevant  dimensions
remained  unchanged  under  high  and  low  stress.  It  is  not  spatial  either,  because
heightened stress reduced the Stroop effect even when the color and the word overlaped
in space (as in the present studies). As noted by Chajut and Algom (2003), this latter point
is important because restricted focusing has often been interpreted in the spatial sense as
a  more  narrowly  concentrated beam (Chajut,  1996 ;  Tsal& & Shalev,  1996,  Urbach &
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Spitzer, 1995 ; cf. Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), as enhanced processing of central
stimuli  (Baddeley,  1992),  as  the relative neglect  of  low-probability  stimuli  (Hockey &
Hamilton,  1983),  or  as  the  actual  shrinkage  of  the  effective  visual  field  (Williams,
Tonymon, & Andersen, 1990, 1991). We agree that these notions do not apply when the
relevant (color) and irrelevant (word) dimensions inhere in the same spatial location.
Since the stress effect is not motivational (see Chajut & Algom’s Study 3, see also Huguet
et al., 2004), we also agree with Chajut and Algom (2003) that stress seems to improve the
ability of people « to decompose the stimulus in its constituent dimensions » (p. 245), a
mechanism which, again, is probably activated in an unconscious and default fashion on
the appearance of stress. 
37 Likewise, our findings are compatible with Easterbrook’s (1959) classic « cue-utilization »
hypothesis, which predicts that increased stress/emotional arousal reduces the range of
cue-utilization. From this view, irrelevant cues are eliminated before relevant ones as
capacity diminishes. Low level of arousal would thus result from the simultaneous use of
relevant and irrelevant information, and high level of arousal from incomplete utilization
of relevant information (see also Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). On this basis, it can be
reasonably  assumed  that  upward  comparison  information  or  feedback  induced  a
moderate  level  of  stress/emotional  arousal  which,  in  turn,  decreased  the  ability  to
process semantically (at  least  temporarily)  and hence reduced the size of  the Stroop
effect. The smaller Stroop effect was associated here (especially in Study 1) with a global
acceleration of responses to all stimuli (incongruent words and control signs), which can
also be taken as evidence that upward comparison increased stress/emotional arousal
(Cohen, 1978). 
38 This global acceleration, however,  runs counter to our earlier rumination hypothesis:
Would internal distractions or ruminations related to one’s inferiority not increase rather
than decrease  the  mean RT2 ?  It  seems therefore  that  upward comparison increased
stress/arousal but did not trigger distracting or task-irrelevant thoughts, at least at the
time during which the Stroop words were processed. Maybe that cognitions related to
one’s  inferiority  (i.e.,  self-focused  attention)  vanished  quickly  after  the  comparison
information or feedback but led toward heightened level of stress/arousal during the
Stroop session. There is indeed ample reasons to believe that heightened stress/arousal
alone  is  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  present  findings  to  occur  (e.g.,  Baron,  1986).
Furthermore, there is some evidence today that whereas distractor processing is reduced
in conditions of high perceptual load (manipulated by relevant display set size or by
different processing requirements for identical displays), it is increased in conditions of
high working memory load (Lavie, 2005 ; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). From
this emerging literature3, ruminations about one’s inferiority at the time during which
the Stroop words were processed would have undermine the participants’ capacity to
actively maintain current processing priorities (i.e., identifying the color rather than the
word as fast as possible while minimizing errors) which, in turn, would have increase
both the mean RT and Stroop interference itself. This is not what happened, quite the
contrary. 
39 Third,  as  also  noted  by  a  number  of  authors  (Besner,  2001;  Mari-Beffa,  Estevez,  &
Danziger, 2000 ), the reduction or even elimination of a Stroop effect does not speak to
the ultimate fate of the words. Does this reduction (or elimination) necessarily mean that
word processing at the semantic level is altered ? It does not. MacKinnon et al. (1985) as
well as Huguet et al. (1999) found some signs of this alteration, as the smaller Stroop
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effect  was  associated  with  a  reduction  in  recognition memory  for  the  Stroop words
(suggesting that attention affected Stroop interference at an early stage where the degree
of semantic processing could be altered). In Huguet et al.’s (2004) study, however, the
smaller Stroop effect occurred while recognition memory was unchanged (while using
exactly the same material as before). This dissociation (i.e., decreased Stroop effect with
word processing unchanged) is consistent with Mari-Beffa et al.’s (2000) claim that the
reduction of the Stroop effect is not sufficient evidence for concluding that word-level
processing is altered (see also Bibi, Tzelgov, & Henik, 2000). Mari-Beffa et al. (2000) and
Besner (2001),  all  used the negative priming effect for their  demonstration.  Negative
priming in the Stroop paradigm refers to the observation that ignoring one stimulus
dimension  in  a  display  (i.e.,  prime  display)  interferes  with  responding  to  the  other
stimulus dimension in a subsequent display (i.e., target display), if they are related (e.g.,
ignoring the word BLUE in the prime display and identifying the colour blue in the target
display). One way of finding out whether the reduction or elimination of a Stroop effect is
associated with an alteration of  word processing is to see whether this  reduction or
elimination is associated with a negative priming effect. Mari-Beffa et al. (2000) found this
effect in the absence of Stroop interference. Besner (2001) found a negative priming effect
despite the elimination of Stroop interference. Both findings lead one to conclude that
the Stroop effect is not an exhaustive measure of word processing. A reduced Stroop
effect with unchanged long-term memory for the Stroop words (Huguet et al., 2004) leads
to  exactly  the  same  conclusion.  Negative  priming  or  recognition  memory  were not
measured here and thus deciding whether upward comparison did or did not alter word
processing is difficult, to say the least. What can be said is that this comparison made a
huge difference in the size of the Stroop effect. 
40 Finally, this effect has been shown to be extremely robust when the local context of the
Stroop task is  unchanged (i.e.,  all  letters coloured,  words and colours simultaneously
presented in the same spatial location, same number of incongruent words and baseline
items). In this standard condition, the reduction and even more so the elimination of
Stroop  interference  seems  highly  unlikely.  This  is  another  reason  why  the  present
findings are especially interesting. They show that self-related information arising from
the social world can influence cognitive phenomena which are yet typically examined
outside social psychology.
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NOTES
1.This contrast was still significant while removing the male participants, t(1,21) = 2.69, p
 < 02. Both the main effect for Stroop stimuli, F(1, 21) = 39.60, p < .0001 ( F0682= .65), and the
Stroop stimuli x Social Comparison interaction, F(3, 21) = 3.02, p = .05 ( F0682= .30), were also
significant with this smaller sample. 
2.For information, this effect (decreased mean RT) did not always occur in past research.
Whereas it was present in Huguet et al.’s (2004) study, where the person present
(confederate) was explicitly presented as a competitor, it was not in Huguet et al.’s (1999)
coaction study, in which the coactor’s presence was supposedly incidental. 
3.This literature in fact suggests the existence of two selective attention mechanisms: a
mechanism serving to reduce distractor perception in situations that exhaust perceptual
capacity (a rather passive mechanism whereby irrelevant distractor interference is
prevented simply because there is insufficient capacity for processing the distractors),
and a cognitive control mechanism that reduces interference from perceived distractors
as long as cognitive control functions are available to maintain current priorities (low or
moderate cognitive load).
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ABSTRACTS
This paper expands on prior research demonstrating the power of social comparison in Stroop’s
paradigm. In two experiments, it is shown that the Stroop effect is reduced whenever the subject
is threatened by social comparison, even in the lack of competitive instructions and comparison
others during the Stroop session. These new findings show that self-related information arising
from the  social  world can influence  cognitive  phenomena which  are  yet  typically  examined
outside social psychology.
Cet  article  s’inscrit  dans  le  prolongement  d’une  série  de  recherches  faisant  apparaître  la
comparaison sociale comme un puissant régulateur de l’effet Stroop. Les résultats de deux études
expérimentales  montrent  que  cet  effet  est  réduit  dès  lors  que  le  sujet  est  confronté  à  une
comparaison qui lui est défavorable, cela même en l’absence d’instructions compétitives et des
personnes  impliquées  dans  cette  comparaison  au  moment  de  l’activité  cible.  Ces  nouveaux
résultats  montrent  que  des  informations  en  rapport  à  soi  issues  de  l’environnement  social
peuvent  influencer  des  phénomènes  cognitifs  encore  typiquement  étudiés  en  dehors  de  la
psychologie sociale.
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